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Roundtable Discussion
Saturday, January 21, 1995
Vanderbilt University School of Law
Nashville, Tennessee
The Symposium panelists participating in this discussion
included: Mr. Edgar J. Asebey, Professor Jonathan I. Charney,
Professor Christopher C. Joyner, Ms. Lee A. Kimball, and
Professor Catherine Tinker.*
Assume the United States has become a
DANIEL W. SIMcox:m
party to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity'
(Biodiversity Convention or Convention) and Speaker of the House
Newt Gingrich calls you in and asks you, "What does this
What
I do not quite understand it.
Convention mean?
obligations and what opportunities does it pose for the United

States?

While the Senate heard considerable testimony before

what
ratifying this Convention, I would like to know specifically
2
obligations this Convention imposes on the United States."
PROFESSOR JOYNER: First of all, in terms of the Convention's
jurisdictional scope, I would explain to Mr. Gingrich that the
United States and its territories would be bound under this
Convention. Species in the United States and its terrorities,
including its territorial sea and exclusive economic zones, would
be protected under the Biodiversity Convention from humanUnder the
made injury and from unnatural species harm.
Convention, it would be the responsibility of the United States
government to implement legislation that would protect those
species from unwarranted intrusion by human-made influence.
The United States would have the responsibility to enforce those

Mr. Asebey is President, CEO, and founder of Andes Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. Professor Charney is a Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University School of
Law. Professor Joyner is a Professor of International Law with the Department of
Government at Georgetown University. Ms. Kimball is a consultant in Treaty
Development and International Institutions. Professor Tinker is an Associate
Professor of Law at Chapman University School of Law.
Mr. Simcox was the 1994-1995 Editor-in-Chief of the Vanderbilt
Journalof TransnationalLaw and served as moderator for this discussion.
1.
Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signatureJune 5, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity
Convention].
2.
As of the date of the Symposium, the Senate had not ratified the
Convention.

836

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 28:835

laws on its nationals in the United States, as well as on vessels
traveling outside its borders that are registered in the United
States. Moreover, other conventions related to biodiversity would
provide additional obligations upon the United States.
Ultimately, the theme that I would emphasize to Mr. Gingrich
is that the Biodiversity Convention would serve the best interests
of the United States. By becoming a party to the Biodiversity
Convention, the United States would become an important
symbol to the rest of the world. It would join a large majority of
states that have already become parties to it. To make this
Convention work would require the commitment, enforcement,
and due diligence of U.S. government agencies.
PROFESSOR TINKER: Considering my questioner, I would not
disagree with what Professor Joyner said, but would change the
emphasis of my presentation.
I would talk about the
opportunities presented by the Biodiversity Convention. I would
emphasize that the Convention secures rights for our
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to access genetic
resources in developing states. Securing access to these raw
materials from which companies may produce future products is
important to guarantee future U.S. profits.

MR. Simcox:

However, before we became a party to this

Convention our pharmaceutical companies were happy and now,
from what I understand, most of our pharmaceutical companies
are concerned.
PROFESSOR TInKER: Well, actually, it is true that many U.S.
biotech industries and their lobbying groups have supported the
Biodiversity Convention. If you review the U.S. Senate hearings
from April 1994,3 you will find support for this Convention from
biotechnology industry groups that support U.S. ratification of the
Biodiversity Convention because they need raw materials for their
future growth.
If the United States does not ratify the Convention, it will face
retaliation and U.S. companies will not be able to compete in the
international market. For example, after the United States
refused to sign the Convention in 1992, Venezuela barred U.S.
companies from engaging in further biodiversity prospecting in
the rain forest in Venezuela. That is pretty serious retaliation
against U.S. companies that need to be on the cutting edge to
compete and guarantee prosperity in the future.
Ms. KnBmALL: I think I would agree very much with the
approach taken by Professor Tinker and add that U.S. companies

3.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (Treaty Doc. 103-20): Hearing
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994).
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need the kind of stable investment climate that the Biodiversity
Convention will establish in developing countries.
We talked quite a bit yesterday in the panel discussion about
how conservation is moving from a species-specific approach to a
different, habitat-oriented approach. The Biodiversity Convention
provides the United States with an opportunity to look at its own
conservation laws and maybe move away from a species-specific
approach to more of a habitat-focused approach. Of course, this
opportunity raises questions about the Endangered Species Act.
The ensuing political dialogue will allow the United States to
examine its priorities and decide how to allocate its resources to
preserve biodiversity.
MR. ASEBEY: Well, I would answer very much in the same
way as the other members of the panel. Having been born in
Bolivia and being a United States businessman, I find my view
influenced by the perspectives of the South and North.4 I can see
things from both points of view. Thus, I think the mistake
(regarding competitiveness, etc.) often made in the United States
is focusing on what the Convention will do and what burdens it
will impose on citizens and corporations. Focusing so narrowly is
often a mistake.
Whether the United States becomes a party to the
Biodiversity Convention or not, a U.S.-based bioprospecting
company would still need to comply with certain criteria imposed
by the developing country where the biodiversity materials sought
are located. Therefore, in many ways, the legislation of other
countries is as important to companies seeking access to genetic
resources as the laws of the United States. In simplest terms, the
issue is access, and who controls it.
For example, assume a company wants to collect natural
products from Brazil. Assume also that Brazil imposes specific
requirements on companies before they can do business in Brazil.
A company may need to train a certain number of Brazilian
scientists, or guarantee a certain quantum of technology transfer,
If such a company wants access to Brazilian
for example.
biodiversity, U.S. law or the United States interpretation of the
Convention may be less important than Brazilian law. So I think
that it is very important to keep an eye on the practical concerns
of U.S. companies. The United States must remember that it is
important to ensure access to other countries' biodiversity.

4.

Industrialized or "First World" nations are referred to here as the

"North." Underdeveloped or "Third World" nations are referred to here as the
"South." See Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting:
FujfiUingthe Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 703
(1995).
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In the past, pharmaceutical companies and other industrial
interests have been able to freely access biodiversity mostly
because developing states did not fully realize the potential value
of biodiversity. United States pharmaceutical companies were not
necessarily going in and stealing other countries' genetic
resources. The problem has been that developing countries have
not had the means to fully capture the valuable potential of their
biological resources.
Ms. KIMBALL: Is it in your company's interest for the United
States to ratify the Convention?
MR. ASEBEY: It is in the best interest of my company, Andes
Pharmaceuticals, and all U.S. businesses that have an interest in
accessing and conserving biodiversity, that the United States
ratify the Convention. I think some of the retaliations referred to

by Professor Tinker are very real. Moreover, even if I could meet
Brazil's criteria for doing business there (engaging in biodiversity
prospecting), Brazil might adopt a policy that discriminates
against U.S.-based companies because the United States is not a
party to the Convention. In such a situation, the U.S. companies
would lose access to Brazil's genetic resources.
PROFESSOR TnINER: Yes, that is the key. If the United States
becomes a party to the Convention, then Brazil or Venezuela
cannot deny access to U.S. companies without violating
international law.
MR. ASEBEY: Exactly. Becoming a party to the Biodiversity
Convention is a matter of maintaining U.S. competitiveness.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: I would like to add two things. One is
that it is in the United States interest to protect biodiversity
worldwide. Were the United States to join, the Convention would
acquire additional authority. The United States endorsement
would encourage widespread ratification and therefore more
pressure would be put on states to strive to achieve the goals of
this Convention. Ultimately, the United States would benefit and
the world would benefit from the full implementation of this
Biodiversity Convention.
The second thing is the importance of the United States
becoming a party to the Convention. By becoming a party to it,
the United States would become a player in the development of
the Convention, its interpretation, its evolution, its protocols, and
whatever else flows from it. As such, the United States can
influence the Convention's development and encourage its
improvement over time.
To the contrary, if the United States is not a party, it cannot
influence the development of the Convention. By becoming a

party, it can influence the future.

The development of the

Convention without the United States will place U.S. interests at
risk. However, if the United States participates, it can optimize
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its interests and use its geopolitical power by participating in and

influencing the

development

of the

Convention

and

its

interpretation.
MR. SIMcox: Let me ask you about your point, to make sure

that we all understand. You said it is in the United States own
interest to make sure that worldwide biodiversity is preserved.
Can you explain why?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
From a parochial, industrial
perspective, if you want to harvest the biodiverse resources of
developing states, you need to make sure those resources are
preserved. Preserving genetic and other resources worldwide is
important to the United States as a nation because its
companies use such
pharmaceutical and agroprocessing
So, promoting biodiversity
materials for health and food.
promotes the United States interests. The United States should
want to preserve a certain level of biodiversity across a diverse
global ecosystem.
MR. ASEBEY: In support of that point, the National Cancer
Institute receives natural products from numerous developing
countries. I believe seven to nine of these countries operate
under a legal instrument called a Letter of Collection,5 which
ensures U.S. access. This access could disappear from many of
these countries if the United States does. not ratify the
Convention.
We should not underestimate the
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
possibility of retaliation raised earlier. The Basel Convention on
the Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 6 in particular, has
established some precedent for such discrimination in
international law. States that are parties to the Basel Convention
may trade in hazardous waste; states that are not parties to the

Basel Convention are effectively excluded from this trade with
state parties. If the United States does not become a party to the
Basel Convention, it will not be able to transport its hazardous
waste to state parties. A similar regime may develop regarding
biodiverse resources under the Biodiversity Convention. Such a
development would impede the economic development of nonstate
parties.

5.
Formerly known as the Letter of Intent, the Letter of Collection is a
document signed between a source country and the National Cancer Institute,
providing the basis for accessing genetic resources in exchange for certain
assurances from the National Cancer Institute. See Asebey & Kempenaar, supra
note 4, at 721-24.
6.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657.
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MR. SIMCOX: But is this Biodiversity Convention not a little
different from the Basel Convention? If, as, Professor Tinker
mentioned, Venezuela barred nonparties from bio-prospecting,

would a cartel of resource-rich states be able to keep the United
States from gaining access to such materials?
PROFESSOR CHARNBY:
In response, I will return to Mr.
Asebey's point. At present, biodiversity harvesting does not
involve big bucks. It is not very costly to make a product using a
genetic resource. It may be easier for a company to acquire that
resource through the Convention. A U.S. company may be able to
bribe other countries to let them take the genetic resource. But
such a situation can be harder for the United States. There is
nothing in the Biodiversity Convention that precludes states from
granting U.S. companies access to their genetic resources. But
those states may find it easier in the short run, maybe even in the
longer run, to make it difficult for the U.S. companies to obtain
that access. Even if the United States is not a party, state parties
may take the position that the United States must follow the
obligations of the Biodiversity Convention, and if not they would
not let U.S. companies in to harvest genetic resources.
PROFESSOR TlNuKmm Private U.S. companies can cut a lot of
private deals with states that are party to the Convention.
However, the stability of the companies' access to biodiversity
resources in those countries is probably limited.
MR. SIMcox: So what the panel is suggesting is that it is
cheaper for the United States to go along with the Convention

than to try to deal with a cartel, which may impose higher
transactional costs and result in less stability of access.
PROFESSOR TIKER: May I have a moment to discuss the
language of the Convention with Professor Charney? When you
refer to aspirational goals, could not the language of the
Convention be seen as much stronger? It is an actual obligation
of a state party to uphold the objectives of the Convention. For
example, if a state party to the Convention denied biodiversity
access to companies of a state also party to the Convention, that
would be a breach of the obligations of the Convention. The
offended state party could invoke the dispute resolution
provisions in the Convention. A state party could not unilaterally,
or as part of a cartel, deny access without some type of
repercussions; denying access would violate the objectives of the
Convention in Article I.
Assume that the United States is a party. To respond to the
cartel argument raised, I am suggesting that if all the relevant
states are parties to the Convention, then international law will
resolve the situation. The United States could rely on the
language of the Convention to make its claim that it had been
denied access to a particular state's biodiverse resources.
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PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
Let us look at Article 27 of the
Convention; it is a dispute settlement provision. This provision
may have teeth.
Professor Tinker has asserted that this
provision-specifically Article 27, paragraph 3-has teeth. That
paragraph states:
When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this
Convention, or any time thereafter, a State or regional economic
integration organization may [not shall] declare in writing to the
Depository that for a dispute not resolved in accordance with
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 above, it accepts one or
7 both of the
following means of dispute settlement as compulsory.

The word "may" means that a state has the option of
accepting the provision as compulsory or not. So the United
States might decide that it will not accept the provision as
compulsory.
Therefore, it will not be in violation of the
Convention to decline compulsory binding adjudication or
arbitration under this Convention. There is a difference between
"shall" and "may."
"Shall" means you are required by the
provision to submit to the Convention's dispute resolution
procedure. That word is just not here. The default dispute
settlement procedure is paragraph 4, which is conciliation.
PROFESSOR TIMeR: However, paragraph 1 states: "In the
event of a dispute between Contracting Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention, the parties
concerned shall seek solution by negotiation."8 And paragraph 2
states: "If the parties concerned cannot reach agreement by
negotiation, they may jointly seek the good offices of, or request
mediation by, a third party."9
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: That is standard operating procedure
in United Nations documents; it means good faith negotiation.
That is all it means, and good faith negotiation does not require
any particular end result.
Now, I will go the next step. The fact that there is not a
mandatory third-party dispute settlement mechanism in place
does not mean there is no law. A state can be in violation of a
legal obligation even though there is no third-party organ in
existence to decide and enforce the law. I can establish that
proposition.
That gets us back to the terminology of the
Convention, and the question of whether all of the provisions have
fuzzy words around them that make them-outside of the
intellectual property areas-very ordinary.
Alternatively, the

7.
8.
9.

Biodiversity Convention, supra note 1, art. 27, para. 3.
Id. para. 1.
Id. para. 2.
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proposition asserted by Professors Joyner and Tinker is that,
perhaps, there is more hard law in the Convention.
Ms. KIMBALL: I would like to ask how much difference it
makes in practice? For example, for a pharmaceutical company
that is operating in Colombia-and we should ask this question
specifically of Mr. Asebey-in their contracts and arrangements,
how much difference does this Convention's language really make
in the situation of company access to a state's resources?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:

Mr. Asebey's company's contract is

with the government.
PROFESSOR TnKER: Still, if Colombia does something that is
perceived by the U.S. company as being contrary to the
Convention, the U.S. government is probably not going to
intervene in such a case. So does it make a difference whether or
not the dispute settlement provisions in the Convention are
'compulsory or elective?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:

Well, yes, it does in two ways. First,

arbitration only kicks in once a state has let a U.S. company in
the door and they have entered into a contract. Remember, there
is a lot in this Convention outside of intellectual property.
PROFESSOR TINKER:
No doubt, but in this particular
circumstance, the access of U.S. companies to a state's resources
is the important objective.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: But the company does not have access

until somebody gives it a contract.
PROFESSOR TINKER: Right.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
And if you

do not have this
Convention, then they may decide not to give them the contract
so you never get to the point we are discussing.
MR. AsEBEY: It would definitely be comforting to get those
agreements.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: But you may be in that situation for
the next thirty years.
MR. SIMcOx: While there is apparently some disagreement
on the meaning of the language of the dispute resolution
provision, and about its practical relevance, I would like to move
on to another general hypothetical.
PROFESSOR JOYNER:
Before moving on to another
hypothetical, I would like to ask the panel to summarize what we
have just said. Why is it in U.S. interests to become a party to
this Convention? Give me a list of reasons.
MR. ASEBEY:

First, access.

Improvement in the stability of

access. Second, expectations of legal behavior. Companies know
what to expect.
PROFESSOR TINKER: Third, to preserve biodiversity worldwide.

To provide a specific example, suppose the corn crop in the
Midwest is threatened by a plague and none of our seeds will save
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the crop, and a U.S. company finds a wild species of maize in the
highlands of Mexico that would be effective. A U.S. company may
use part of Mexico's biodiversity, cross-breed it with domestic
species, and ultimately save the farm economy in the Midwest.
That is a clear and simple example. Nonetheless, it illustrates
why there is a need to preserve a global library of genes and
species. That is one of the values of biodiversity.
PROFESSOR JOYNER:

To the converse, why is ratifying this

particular Convention not in U.S. interests? What does the
United States have to lose by becoming a party to this particular
Convention?
PROFESSOR TrNKER: It may be costly. We will have to pay.
Obviously the trade-off is to get this access to the genetic
resources located in the developing countries, the developed
countries have to put up money. There is a voluntary fund that is
being negotiated now, and discussion about who is going to have
to pay into this fund. It is not clear now whether it will be
through the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in the World Bank
or through some other financial mechanism. Most likely this
fund will be associated with the GEF. Where the United States
will at least keep a vote, it will have weighted voting rights and
will have some control over how the money is spent. Ultimately,
however, the Convention is going to impose some financial costs
on the United States.
PROFESSOR JOYNER: What about technology transfer?
PROFESSOR TINKER: Article 1 of the Convention provides two
ways of achieving the main objective, which is the equitable
sharing of benefits: One, Third World nations provide access to
genetic resources, which is their commitment under the
Convention, and two, First World nations effectuate the
appropriate transfer of relevant technology and appropriate
funding, which is what the United States and other developed
countries agree to contribute when they ratify the Convention.
Other developed countries have become parties to the Convention.
All of the European countries have ratified it as have Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia.
It is very important to remember that
MR. ASEBEY:
An
technology transfer is based on voluntary contracts.
argument the United States made at one point was that there
might be compulsory licensing of patented technology. The truth
is that much of this technology is in the public domain in the

United States.

So in some ways the United States would be

training scientists with knowledge that they could probably get at
anyway. It is not that the United States would be throwing
patents out the window. There is always the possibility that if
pharmaceutical companies do not like the terms required by a
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particular state, they can choose not to access the genetic
resources of that state. That is an option. However, that is
probably not a good choice because it would limit access to the
resources of that and other member states.
AUDIENCE ME BER: Are most of the major pharmaceutical
companies accessing biodiverse resources through contracts?
MR- ASEBEY: Well, usually access has not been through
contract. It has been through less formal arrangements with
parties in a "source" country. One of the greatest values of the
Convention despite all the criticism that has been voiced is that
the information costs for the developing world have gone way

down. Everybody knows that biodiversity has value; whereas five
years ago some companies could have much more easily walked
into a country, paid some local people to collect whatever plants
or other resources they wanted, and left. The point I want to
make is that while there have been some contracts in the past, in
the future, both contracts and permission from Government
Ministries of Environment will be required.
PROFEsSOR CHARNEY: Excuse me, if you will recall, the basic
rule of international law that has not been followed is that every
sovereign state has the right to exploit its own resources. One
needs the consent of the state to take resources out of the state.
Now what has happened in the past is that nobody paid attention.
So a pharmaceutical company would enter a state, hire some
locals, and rip the stuff out of the land, put it in a box, and ship it
out. Now, everybody has a greater understanding of the value of
biodiversity, and the states and the legislatures take the position
that before you take resources out of a state-like an
antiquity-you are going to have to check off a couple of boxes
and do the right thing: pay the state. The Convention sets the
parameters for the field of biological resources. Now, it may be
fair or it may be arbitrary, but it sets the structure for how these
states-that now realize they have valuable resources and realize
that they have been ripped off in the past-will deal with these
resources.
Ms. KiBALL: I would like to ask if the Convention's objective
is to rehabilitate the ecosystems that have already been harmed
and whether that would help countries that have fewer resources.
PROFESSOR TIUER: A lot of this law is still being developed
and its effect is not clear. We are judging a Convention that has
only been in force for a year. Under the Convention, the Global
Environment Facility (GEF) is establishing a fund, estimated at
two billion dollars, for a period of three years. That fund will be

replenished from donations by developed countries, like the
United States, Germany, and Japan, and developing countries
can apply to the GEF to fund certain projects. So, if Brazil
wanted to propose a project to replenish and rehabilitate certain
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habitats or ecosystems, it could do that. The GEF has certain
priorities and program guidelines to determine which proposals
are funded.
MR. ASEBEY: Professor Charney mentioned how developing
countries might have been "ripped off' in the past. In a paper1 0
last year, I made reference to that issue in the most polite terms I
could find. I was taken to task by Resources for the Future (RFF)

with all sorts of economic arguments that sought to undermine
my thesis that this had actually happened. About three months
ago a UNDP" -commissioned report' 2 concluded that the
developing world was losing about five billion dollars a year in
potential royalties from agricultural and pharmaceutical
developments that were being used at no cost by transnational
food and drug companies.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: Does that not argue that maybe the
United States ought to stay out of the Biological Diversity
Convention in order to avoid paying the price?
MR. ASEBEY: Well, it depends. If you look at it in the short
run, yes, because the Convention will impose immediate costs. If
you want to maintain a worldwide genetic library in the long run,
and maintain access to it, then, no. In the short-term, it will be a
transfer of wealth to the developing world. In the long run, that
may end up guaranteeing that more biodiversity is available for
both the developing and developed worlds.
MR. SIMCOX:
Allow me to pose another hypothetical.
Assume, hypothetically, the United States has moved a bill
through Congress to build a dam in Tennessee using federal
money. Also assume that the environment will be impacted
because this dam is going to eradicate a small fish known as the
"slug darter."1 3 The U.S. government would receive a flood of
letters complaining about the loss of this small fish. Would the
United States have any problems under the Convention on
Biological Diversity if it wanted to build a dam in Tennessee that
would wipe out a tiny, inedible fish?

10.

Edgar J. Asebey, Indigenous Knowledge and Intellectual Property:

Towards Equitable Compensation (Apr. 12, 1994) (unpublished paper, on file with
the author) (discussing the patent system, indigenous knowledge, and
compensation mechanisms).

11.

United Nations Development Program.

12.
Bio-piracy Costs Third World $5.4bn a Year, FINANCIAL TIMES (London)
October 28, 1994, News: World Trade Section. The term "biopiracy" refers to the

North's rise of genetic biodiversity resources without appropriate compensation.
13.
The "slug darter" is a fictional cousin of the snail darter, a species of
perch that found its way into the United States Supreme Court. TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978).
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Ms. K ALL: If the fish is protected under the Endangered
Species Act, the United States obligation stems from U.S. law.
There are no specific species protection obligations under the
Convention at the moment.
PROFESSOR JOYNER:

If you are a party to the Convention, I

believe you have to undertake scientific research to ascertain how
seriously threatened the species is.
PROFESSOR TINER:
To understand the issue from the
international law perspective, we must separate it from U.S.
domestic, political concerns at the moment. If the United States
ratifies this Convention, it will be obligated to develop national
plans and legislation.
Our delegates to the various treaty
negotiations and meetings in various U.S. departments-from the
State Department, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
Agriculture Department, Commerce Department, and all the other
federal agencies-have uniformly agreed that U.S. laws would not
really have to change very much. According to these officials, the
United States has the best domestic environmental legislation in
the world. The only obligation arising under the Convention
specifically is this very broad one that each state party have a
national plan and national legislation.
Now, the content of the plan is up to the individual state to
determine. There could be domestic arguments about whether a
certain piece of U.S. legislation supports or undermines the
purposes of the Convention and whether it is a good idea or a bad
idea. But it is a very broad, general obligation to have simply a
national plan and national legislation. The Convention itself does
not prescribe exactly what the content of this plan or legislation
must be.
MR. Siucox: But if the slug darter is on the endangered
species list and the proposed dam will eradicate the species, will
the United States breach an international responsibility by
constructing this dam?
PROFESSOR TIKR: Such an action would breach the general

international responsibility to conserve and sustain biological
diversity, but it would not be a specific breach under the
Convention. Professor Joyner talked about the jurisdictional
scope of the Convention; the slug darter would be a domestic
matter within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
Another state could not take the United States to task even if it
killed off the last slug darter that existed in the whole world,
absent some activity beyond national jurisdiction or in the
territory of another state. There really would be nothing that
another country could do if the United States chose to do
something within its borders.
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MR. Smlcox: Would the result be the same if the United
States were not just wiping out a species, but the last salt water
marsh-a sensitive ecosystem-in the United States?
PROFESSOR TINKER: Unfortunately, yes.
MR. SIMcox: What if we were to assume that the Brazilian
legislature planned to build a dam that would wipe out half of the
rain forest?
PROFESSOR TINKER: The Brazilian government can get away
with that too if it is paying for the dam itself as part of a national
development plan.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:

It is their territory, their resources,

their jurisdiction, and their law; it is their responsibility. The
question with Brazil is interesting because it involves not only
their own responsibility, but also the impact their responsibility
or irresponsibility will have on the rest of the international
community if the eradication of those tropical forests leads to
more global warming.
MR. SImcox: Right. There seems to be a consensus here
that under the Convention, if the United States wipes out any
number of species within its borders, the United States will not
breach any international obligation.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: It is true that the four corners of the
Convention do not impose any responsibility on the United States
for such an action. But the object and purpose of the Convention
and the ultimate result of its being brought into full force will be
an international system that will protect these species. So if you
are asking if the Convention will prevent the building of the dam
tomorrow, the answer is no, it will not. However, the expectation
is that once the Convention gets going and is implemented,
domestic and international standards will become more refined,
that there will be a system in place that will protect species,
genes, and ecosystems. That is the ultimate objective. The
Convention leads the international community down the path to
an end result that would protect biodiversity.
MR. Simcox: So you are saying while it would not stop the
dam tomorrow, it may stop the dam fifty years from now?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:

Yes, but that requires a consensus of

the international community that is more substantive than is
within the four corners of the Convention. So, hopefully, the
United States will play a role. That is part of my original
argument that the United States should play a role in the
development of this Convention into something that is more hard
law and that will better protect the environment in a way that the
United States believes will achieve the appropriate balance of
interests.
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PROFESSOR TINKER: I agree with Professor Charney. As
treaties are implemented, states are going to have to develop more
specific guidelines to protect the variety of life on earth.
MR. Simcox: So to ensure that the United States has a voice
in the development of this international body of law, it needs to
get involved in the whole process.
PROFESSOR TINKER: Yes.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: Another point is that the United States
should not lose sight of the fact that this Convention has focused
attention on a real problem that has not been acknowledged
previously. I think that is an important thing to keep in mind
because the Convention is not going to disappear. The phrase
"biodiversity" is not going to go away. Instead, the Convention
will cause this concern to expand as people realize that there are
more and more problems around the world that need to be
resolved along those lines.
Professor Joyner earlier this morning mentioned the phrase,
"common heritage." I think it is important to focus on the text of
the Convention. But, we should also look at the international law
that has developed outside of the agreement. In fact, there may
be law that protects species and ecosystems that is already in
international law, notwithstanding the Convention.
MR. Simcox: What are the sources of such international law?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
Well, I mean, the whole idea of
common heritage of humanity. It is an open question, but the

idea is that there is at least a common heritage out there, and
there may even be resources that are within a particular state but
belong to the common heritage of humanity. One thing I think we
have talked about is that if we are going to wipe out half of the
rain forest, we may cause global warming. We also may do things
ultimately that will cause ozone depletion. Those kinds of actions
may injure states either legally or actually.
This existing
international law gives other states standing to bring
international claims. So there may be circumstances where the
idea of biodiversity is already in the common heritage of humanity
under international law. One might argue that the existing
international law of biodiversity requires a library of genes that
are part of the common heritage of humanity and that must be
protected. I do not think I would go that far, but I think it is
easier to argue that the big changes that affect the global
ecosystem in a major way may already be protected. States are
under a legal obligation not to do things that are harmful to other
states.
MR. SIMCOX:
Compared to developed countries, like the
United States, which has developed much of its land already, does
the Biodiversity Convention impose an unfair obligation on Brazil
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and other developing states by requiring them to maintain their
land in pristine form?
Developing countries will point out
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
that developed states have already developed; the less developed
states should have a right to develop as well. To developing
states, the restrictions of the Convention may seem unfair. The
argument in response partly would be-and I do not know if you
this
support
to
analyses
get economic
always
can
conclusion-that you will develop better, more sanely, and
profitably if you do not destroy your rain forest. In fact, we are
not asking you to sacrifice development for the environment, but
to develop in a way that is environmentally and economically safe.
MR. SIMCOX: Well, that is a nice statement to make, but if I
am a farmer who owns a great deal of land in Brazil and
somebody comes and offers me a good deal of money to take down

the trees, I might take that deal.
PROFESSOR CHAPmNEy: But I am arguing long-term versus
short-term.
MR. Srmcox: Okay. In the short-term such destruction may
not be able to be prevented, but in the long-term it may?
That is the whole argument for
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
creating economic alternatives to substitute for short-term
destructive enterprises. Until the economics of biodiversity are
better understood and individuals recognize that biodiverse
friendly enterprises offer viable options that are competitive from
an economic perspective, more destructive uses will seem
economically rational to the individuals. But, in the long-term,
the farmer may find the biodiverse-friendly alternative
economically viable as well. So we can say to that farmer, "Today
I can offer you a different use that will be as lucrative as chopping
down all of your trees and selling them."
MR. SIMcox: You are talking about biodiversity prospecting?
Biodiversity
Yes, as one way.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
prospecting has been touted as potentially being a better
My
economic alternative than these more destructive uses.
not
just
competitive-until,
is
economically
until
it
that
is
feeling
bioprospecting, but other low-impact biodiversity uses that would
be acceptable under the treaty are available to the developing
world-you are not going to promote conservation, or at least as
much conservation as you could have, without those systems.
The developing world should not knock down its forests to run its
mills like the United States did one hundred years ago. While
that is wrong, I think you need proof of economic alternatives to
establish that other means of development are better.
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SIMcox:

We

have used

prospecting" a number of times.
explain what it means?
MR. ASEBEY:

this

term
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"biodiversity

Mr. Asebey, could you briefly

It is just the search through biodiversity

resources for bioactive compounds with potential pharmaceutical,
agricultural, or other economic use.
MR. SImcox: So if I were in Brazil and a biodiversity
prospector, what would I do?
MR. ASEBEY:
I will give you an example of what Andes
Pharmaceuticals has done.
My company is a biodiversity
prospecting company and what we do is transfer technology
through a joint venture with the source country that then makes
arrangements with local communities, universities, and
governments to enter into a specific area, in which it can collect
natural product samples for bioactivity testing. Currently we
screen for anti-cancer activity as well as some topical diseases.

MR. SIMcOx: Ultimately, you are looking for something that
can be useful as a drug?

MR. ASEBEY: Right. Either in the developing world or in the
First World markets.
PROFESSOR TINKER:
Mr. Asebey's suggestion regarding
economic alternatives is certainly correct and is being done now
by private companies outside the Convention. It is not only that
the developed world is saying to developing countries, "do not do
what we did; do what we say." Instead, it is saying, "we will give
you that alternative under the Convention by offering technology
transfer and financing" so this farmer does not have to cut down
all his trees.
MR. ASEBEY: I agree. There is support in the developed
world for the view that they are signing this Convention to try to
create economic alternatives and support the developing world so
that they do not have to develop in a destructive manner.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Do debt-for-nature swaps come into play
in biodiversity negotiations?
MR. ASEBEY: Right now they have fallen out of favor. One of
the big pluses of debt-for-nature swaps was their novelty. That
plus has kind of gone away because they are not as hot as they
used to be due to economic changes.
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: Let me try in two seconds to define
debt-for-nature swaps.
Third World states had very high debts to First World banks
during the 1970s and 1980s that could not be paid off.
Environmental groups wanted to encourage good environmental
practices in those debtor countries. A debt-for-nature swap is a

vehicle by which the environmental groups would buy the debt at
a discounted rate and sell that debt back to the Third World
countries in exchange for some commitment to environmental

1995]

ROUNDTABLE

protection through a variety of schemes.
Basically, the
environmental groups bought the debt at a discounted rate,
which was still a lot of money, and got a Third World state to
commit to a pro-environmental program.
In exchange for
adopting the program, the Third World country got off the
financial hook.
Ms. KIMBALL:
By promoting low impact economic
alternatives, the Convention permits the development of a variety
of schemes that give local peoples the benefit of increased
livelihood. Some other international treaties protect areas or
create reserves of various sorts. Some prevent various types of
land use; some permit no use at all. If we look at some of these
treaties that are complete set-asides and determine additional
ways to use the areas sustainably to create benefits for people
around them, it may, in fact, help to maintain the protected
values in these areas.
PROFESSOR JOYNER: Right. This offers an intermediate use.
The United States did burn down its eastern forests, and now it is
urging developing states to preserve their forests. You should not
engage in certain activities.
The Convention may offer an
alternative that would not be as destructive. That is the idea to
which the Convention aspires.
When you mention burn and cut down the forest, many
people associate the United States with being guilty of that
throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Yet, the
United States has reforested a lot. Brazil can criticize the United
States for not practicing what it preaches, but the United States
is a leading reforester, and agronomists will state that there are

even more trees in the United States now than there were two

4
hundred years ago. 1
MR. ASEBEY: In numbers that is true, but the species and
ecosystems are very fragile because sometimes companies reforest
with single species, such as pine, while historically there was
greater variety. So while the numbers are greater, the ecosystem
has been destroyed.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Should the United States go ahead and
become a party now to influence the Convention, or should it wait
until the Convention slowly develops in the proper way and then
become a party? Also, does the Convention have any teeth?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: The argument in favor of the United
States becoming a party now is that if it gets in on the ground

14.
Conversation with Robert Healy, Agronomist, Duke University. See
generally Christopher C. Joyner, Deforestationin Amazonia: Policies, Politics, and
Global Implications, 16 INTL STUDIES NOTES 24 (Wntr. 1991).
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floor, the United States can help to develop the Convention in
ways that protect the global environment and the interests of the
United States. Some scholars may contend that the United States
should wait and see how it evolves. Well, without United States
participation, chances are greater that the Convention may evolve
in a way that the United States does not want and it would have
forfeited the opportunity to play a role in the Convention's
evolution. That would be a loss.
A second consideration is Article 38, regarding withdrawal. If
the United States becomes a party, it can also withdraw from the
Convention after two years by giving a one year notice. 15 So a
state can get out of this Convention if it does not like what is
happening. So I maintain that it is better for the United States to
be in on the ground floor, and to try to influence this as much as
possible. And if the United States fails, and the Convention turns
out to be a bad deal, then the United States can withdraw.
PROFESSOR JOYNER: At least then, the United States can say

that it has made a good faith effort. If the United States does
ratify, and gets involved in the process, what would be the worst
possible result?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: Really, the big issue is what remedies
are available under international law. Some of them have already
been mentioned. A state might be excluded from access to
biodiverse regions. That may be not only contrary to our interests
but also to the world's interests-that is to biodiversity itself. In
theory, the United States would have legal obligations under this
treaty. Nevertheless, it cannot be forced to defend its actions
allegedly in violation of the Convention before an international
court, unless it consents to litigate the matter. As I have argued,
states can invoke that violation as grounds for responding in a
manner unfavorable to U.S. interests. They can cut off trade
relations; they can send diplomatic protest notes; they can refuse
to have certain kinds of dealings with the United States. And
they could hurt the United States economically. While adverse
military actions are unlikely, there could be undesirable economic
consequences. I suspect, that if I were to sit down and analyze
this matter like Dr. Solow, 16 I would conclude that state parties
could not hurt the United States very much, but they could try. If
I were Peru and you asked me that question, I would respond that
I could be hurt rather badly. Such countries face a greater risk.
The United States does have the advantage of being very powerful

15.
Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, art. 38.
16.
Dr. Andrew Solow addressed the Symposium prior to the Roundtable
discussion.
See Andrew R. Solow & James M. Broadus, Issues in the
Measurementof BiologicalDiversity, 28 Vand. J. Transnat' L. 695 (1995).
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and it does have a very large market in which to sell and buy
goods.
It is not a country that can be easily pressured by
international countermeasures. But there are consequences, and
they do tend to compel the United States to abide by its
international legal obligations.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Why look to public international law?
PROFESSOR CHARNEY: Well, if you are staying within the
Convention, it is not what we call "self-executing."
It is an
international legal obligation that is internationally applicable,
but not domestically.
The Convention cannot be invoked
domestically.
If the United States were to adopt legislation pursuant to the
Convention, then, yes, it is possible the Sierra Club would have
standing to sue. But if the United States does not enact domestic
legislation, the United States would not have such a problem.

But the United States might face a determination by the state
parties or the United Nations General Assembly that the United
States is in violation of the Convention and they may collectively
take action that could hurt the United States in ways that are
more damaging than just one individual state's taking an action.
The resolution that could be adopted might be benign, but could
be more serious, like an embargo or some other countermeasure
collectively that has some bite. Thus, as a result, the United
States may not be able to do business in twenty-five countries,
and that might be detrimental to U.S. interests. The United
States may respond by deciding to get back in line or withdraw
from the Convention. If the United States withdraws, the other
state parties might respond with even harsher measures against
the United States. Thus, withdrawal may not be a viable option
for the United States.
PROFESSOR JOYNER: I would like to put on my conservative
business community hat and ask: how much does the rest of the
world need the United States in terms of this treaty? Does it not
control most of the biotechnology? Does the world really need it?
How can the United States really be hurt, if its technology is
needed so badly?
MR. SImcox: I think there is a great deal of fear about what
this Convention may mean. We have certainly heard a good deal
regarding property rights in the United States. Whether these
fears are well founded is questionable given what we have heard
today. However, I think the greatest thing out there right now is
the fear of what this Convention may mean. There is a fear that
by agreeing to something now, in twenty years the United States
will be sliding into a situation where it may not have control over
activity within its own boundaries, such as building a dam in
Tennessee.
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PROFESSOR JOYNER: The United States could get out of the
Convention.
MR. Smcox: Well, that is true, as Professor Charney has
indicated. But I think there is considerable fear regarding the
United States ceding power to the United Nations and other
international entities. Whether these fears have a legitimate basis
or not, they are significant.
PROFESSOR JOYNER: My question was really a quantitative
one. Does not the United States control most of the biotechnology
in the international community? Does not the United States have
a preponderance of it? Is there really a genuine sense that the
United States could lose out if it does not become a party?
PROFESSOR CHARNT: I will go even further and suggest that
even if you were right, if the United States does not get into this
ballgame, U.S. companies will probably just establish subsidiaries
or other companies under foreign flags and get the advantage as
nationals of state parties that way. Now that cuts a number of
ways. One could argue on the one hand, the United States would
get the stuff anyway. New Zealand will be a party to the
Convention, and U.S. companies will be able to get access to all of
these places through them. Thus, the subsidiary will have all the
technology, the world will be better off, and the United States will
not be committed. On the other hand, the United States would
not have control over U.S. companies; it would not get the tax
benefits from U.S. companies; it would not get the employment
from U.S. companies. This economic activity will go on under
other flags.
PROFESSOR TINKER: I want to refer back to the text of the
Convention again. Article 16, regarding access to and transfer of
technology, goes through some of the specific requirements under
the Convention. I agree with Ms. Kimball; it is fuzzy. It is the
transfer of appropriate technology to the extent possible "as
mutually agreed." 17 Yesterday, we were talking about what
actually has to be transferred: the patent rights, the machinery
for a factory, or the plans detailing the process. We agreed that
there was actually nothing in the Convention that would allow the
U.S. government to go to a U.S.-based company that owns a
patent on a particular technology and say, "You must transfer
this technology to a developing state under the Convention."
PROFESSOR CHARNEY:
The carrot is that if you have the
technology, do you want to use it? If the resources are not grown
in the United States, but they grow abroad, if they want to make

use of this technology, they need to get into these Third World
countries-it is invaluable that they get in. So their desire to get

17.

Biodiversity Convention, supranote 1, arts. 16, 20.
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into the foreign country is the carrot to encourage the United
States to join the Convention.
PROFESSOR TINKER: Implicit in your question was the idea
that this technology transfer is a forced thing. There is absolutely
no requirement in the Convention to do that. If a company
wishes to go, they are going to do it because they have negotiated
a contract that is beneficial to them.
PROFESSOR JOYNER: Its profits, I would think.
MR. SIMcox: Assuming the United States becomes a party to
the Convention, what would you suggest changing to make this
Convention better?
PROFESSOR TINKER: I would like to start off with a wish list.
I would include much stronger language in the Convention that
spells out the role of local communities and indigenous peoples.
MR. Snwcox: That is one of the obligations set forth in the
preamble of the Convention. s Specifically, the preamble sets

forth that this Convention recognizes the vital role that women
should play in the conservation and use of biological diversity. It
also makes similar statements regarding indigenous groups.
Should we interpret your remarks to mean that there is not much
more in the Convention than what is in the preamble?
PROFESSOR TINKER: Yes. When women or indigenous peoples
want to come to one of the conferences of the parties, what
provision is there to make sure they can come-that they are
going to have a role and that they can participate? When national
plans and laws are being set up in the first place, each state
should consult with women, indigenous peoples, and local
communities within their own country. And then later on, once
they are in place, states should include those same groups in
monitoring compliance. If such measures require some funding,
then let those groups be funded. That is the only way that it is
really going to be a meaningful kind of participation. To generally
say that NGOs shall play a role in monitoring the implementation
of this Convention is not enough. How will these groups be
involved? With what funds? Will it be at the expense of dropping
other work that they might be doing? Is not that really the role of
the government? What mechanisms are going to be developed to
do that? I think the Convention has not gone far enough in this
area to specify participation by nongovernmental organizations,
women, indigenous people, and local community groups.
Ms. KnIBALL: I do not think that you could get agreement at
this point among the countries that are trying to ratify this
Convention for firmer or more detailed obligations, so why try?

18.

Id. pmbl.
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What is most important for making this Convention work is
linking it to specific issues in each region. In doing so, it is
equally important to look at the relationships between this and
other biodiversity-related treaties and try to reinforce synergies
among them-try to identify priorities. It is essential to get away
from the species-specific approach and look at large ecosystems
or landscapes, and then define priorities in that region for
protecting varieties of life.
PROFESSOR JOYNER: I think I agree with Ms. Kimball that in
large part the fuzzy language in the Convention may be
considered a weakness by some, but it is also a strength because
it allows for flexibility. It allows for greater acceptance of the
terms by more states and more governments. I think the real key
to this Convention is not so much how it appears on paper, but
how it is implemented in fact. And I think that is where the
United States could play a significant international role should it
become a party to it, not only as a symbol and as a model of how
this Convention should be implemented, but also by encouraging

protocols or additional treaties that would make this Convention
more of a reality than just a paper package.
MR. SIMcox: Initially some conference of the parties will be
convened annually?
PROFESSOR JOYNER: Yes. I was gratified to learn yesterday
from Bob Ward 19 that the next conference of parties in Bali,
Indonesia is going to be devoted to the marine environment. So,
they are attacking the largest part of the earth's surface in terms
of biodiversity at one of their earliest sessions. That I think is
encouraging.
MR. ASEBEY: I would have to agree-well, just from my wish
list, not that it would be ratified. I agree with Professor Tinker
absolutely about indigenous rights. But one thing we did not
focus on very much, and I think is one of the most important
aspects of conservation, is not how many species are or are not
lost, and what the satisfactorily verifiable data establishes. If you
go to Latin American and other developing countries, the people
closest to biodiversity are the people who are most impacted by
deforestation and some other destructive uses. These people who
depend on the forest or the biosystems for their living, for their
survival, they are being displaced all the time. In Brazil, Bolivia,
Colombia, and other states, the governments are often at odds
with the interests of indigenous people.
Signing a great

19.
Mr. Robert Ward addressed the Symposium prior to the Roundtable
Discussion. See W. Robert Ward, Man or Beast: The Convention on Biological
Diversity and The Emerging Law of Sustainable Development, 28 Vand. J.
Transnatl L. 823 (1995).
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Convention with the government will not take care of the interests
of indigenous people. If you look at the Convention from a
Southern perspective, the number one impact is deforestation. In
our academic and scientific centers, we get the statistics on the
number of species and related information, and I think sometimes
we lose sight of the fact that the real issue in developing countries
is people. We not only have recognition here in Article 8, but also
the means for giving a real voice to indigenous peoples
throughout the world. That is something I would like to have
seen.
MR. SIMCOx: Well, do you think this Convention has taken a
big first step in terms of incorporating language regarding
indigenous peoples?
MR. ASEBEY: Yes, absolutely. It is the first time indigenous
knowledge has been mentioned. It is a big step, but there is a
long way to go.
PROFESSOR CEURNEY: I agree with Ms. Kimball that this is
the optimum solution that is also practical. With regard to a wish
list, I would include what Professor Tinker would have wished to
have in the Convention-compulsory binding dispute settlement
procedures.
MR. Simcox: It is time for us to adjourn. I want to thank the
panelists and all of you for coming.

